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GEOMETRY IN THE COURTROOM
NOAH GIANSIRACUSA∗ AND CAMERON RICCIARDI∗∗
ABSTRACT. There has been a recent media blitz on a cohort of mathematicians valiantly working
to fix America’s democratic system by combatting gerrymandering with geometry. While statistics
commonly features in the courtroom (forensics, DNA analysis, etc.), the gerrymandering news raises
a natural question: in what other ways has pure math, specifically geometry and topology, been
involved in court cases and legal scholarship? In this survey article, we collect a few examples with
topics ranging from the Pythagorean formula to the Ham Sandwich Theorem, and we discuss some
jurists’ perspectives on geometric reasoning in the legal realm. One of our goals is to provide math
educators with engaging real-world instances of some abstract geometric concepts.
1. INTRODUCTION
With the upcoming national census in 2020 and ensuing congressional redistricting, the problem
of gerrymandering has become a tremendously hot issue, and rightly so. One of the legal guide-
lines courts have established is that districts must be “compact,” though no proper definition of this
term has been provided (all districts are closed and bounded, so the one you’re thinking of won’t
help!). Occasionally a particularly egregious district is struck down based on ad hoc arguments;
due to the scope and complexity of the problem, however, a more scientific approach is clearly re-
quired. Toward this end, mathematician Moon Duchin formed a group1 embarking on an ambitious
interdisciplinary project with lawyers, political scientists, geospatial analysts, and computer scien-
tists to apply rigorous, sophisticated geometric methods to the problem of detecting and preventing
gerrymandering. Press coverage of these efforts has appeared in Nature, Wired, NBC News, NPR,
etc., often with superficial headlines implicitly suggesting bewilderment that esoteric mathematics
may actually be useful in the real world (gasp!).
While witnessing this deluge of public attention, a simple question came to our minds: when
else has geometry entered the courtrooms, either in actual cases or in legal scholarship? After
finding some intriguing and entertaining examples, we decided to write this survey paper to collect
these in one place and share them with the mathematics community. We hope math teachers will
find ways to incorporate some of this material into their curricula.
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2. BACKGROUND
There was a famous debate in the Harvard Law Review in the early 1970s on what role, if
any, mathematics and quantitative methods should play in jurisprudence [FF70, Tri71b, FF71,
Tri71a] (see also [Kay79, SC13, Suz15, Gia16]). This remains a difficult topic, and one we shall
not address here. Despite caution and controversy, innovation in the technological and scientific
realms has forced the courtroom to accept certain forms of mathematically-framed evidence (think
forensics and DNA analysis, among many other topics [FL01, Ada10]), which generally fall under
the purview of statistics. Given the modern-day ubiquity of statistics, this really comes as no
surprise,4 but what was (for us, at least) less expected is that various geometric concepts from
supposedly “pure” mathematics would find their way into the legal realm, and it is this that we
focus on in this paper.5
In some situations geometric considerations directly enter the legal arguments and judges’ rul-
ings, while in other situations a geometric analysis is provided by an academic outside the legal
case. Moreover, some in the legal profession have used geometric reasoning abstractly to better
understand delicate legal issues, whereas others have argued against the idea of viewing law as an
axiomatic discipline modeled on Euclidean geometry. One of the main matters that arises here is
that of precision. Mathematics is founded on precisely stating all axioms, definition, theorems, etc.,
and avoiding ambiguity like the plague. Law, on the other hand, necessarily deals with amorphous
concepts that defy precise characterization; in fact, it is often advantageous to remain deliberately
vague so as to allow a natural development (cf., [Chr64]). For instance, if the courts had rigorously
defined what they meant by “compact” in the setting of districting, then the prospect is raised
that a duplicitous politician could carefully engineer a gerrymander to satisfy the court’s particular
notion of compactness while still accomplishing the desired electoral outcome. Throughout this
article we will see many manifestations of this tension between the mathematical aim of precisely
defining terms and the legal aim of providing healthy flexibility through careful use of imprecision.
3. A MATTER OF METRICS
We begin where, arguably, geometry itself begins: the Pythagorean formula. In 2005, New
York’s Court of Appeals, the highest court in the state, heard the following case. An undercover
cop caught the appellant, James Robbins, selling drugs near Holy Cross grade school in Manhattan.
At dispute wasn’t whether Robbins was illegally selling drugs, but whether he was doing so within
1,000 feet of the school’s property, since that would subject him to a much harsher punishment.
The defense had argued that the shortest walkable path from the sale location to the school is
764 feet along one street then 490 feet along another, so the total distance is 1,256 feet, safely
outside the drug-free school zone. The prosecution had countered that the straight-line distance
as the crow flies, or in other words the length of the hypotenuse computed using the Pythagorean
formula, is the relevant distance, and that is just over 907 feet, placing the sale within the drug-free
zone. During the appeals case, Robbins’ lawyers colorfully countered this assertion by noting that
“crows do not sell drugs,” but the Court of Appeals nonetheless unanimously ruled against him
and upheld the original felony conviction.
4This is not to say that statistical evidence in the courtroom is a uniquely modern development; indeed, there is a
fascinating case from 1868 in which Harvard Math Professor Benjamin Peirce used the binomial distribution to argue
that the signature on a disputed amendment to a wealthy matron’s will was a forgery [MZ80].
5Since there is presently a surge of interest and writing in the geometry of gerrymandering [Arn17, BD17, SM15,
FH11, HMP10], we mostly avoid this topic in order to give attention to other instances of geometry in the courtroom.
GEOMETRY IN THE COURTROOM 3
At first glance this case appears to hinge entirely on the fact that the statute in question specifies
a numerical value for the distance defining school zones but not the metric to which this distance
refers: the prosecution saw the Euclidean metric (ℓ2 norm) as appropriate, whereas the defense
wanted, aptly enough considering the location of the incident, the Manhattan metric (ℓ1 norm).
Mathematically, neither metric is more valid than the other and they both produce distinct but well-
defined 1000-foot school zones. But there is more to the story here. The defense did not literally
argue ℓ1 over ℓ2 (which is a mathematical argument admitting no clear winner), the defense argued
for using a “pedestrian-distance” defined as the shortest length of a path between two points along
which a person could safely and legally walk. But the Court of Appeals wisely recognized a serious
problem with this notion: it is dynamic. Indeed, the Chief Judge’s opinion asserts:
Plainly, guilt under the statute cannot depend on whether a particular building in a
person’s path to a school happens to be open to the public or locked at the time of a
drug sale. [...] Further, if the pedestrian method of measurement were used, a drug
dealer could take deliberate steps to evade the reach of the statute by putting up
obstructions to render the footpath to a nearby school beyond the 1000-foot limit.
By considering the intent of the statue (“to circumscribe a fixed geographical area, without
regard to whether that area might contain obstacles around which people might have to detour”)
and related laws and cases, the court is able to rule out the pedestrian-distance as a reasonable
choice of metric. But then if pedestrian mobility is irrelevant, there is scant reason to choose the
Manhattan metric over the Euclidean metric, particularly since it was never explicitly argued for.
Thus the ruling by the Court of Appeals is actually quite astute and logical, rather than a mere
mathematical whim.
One might think all this could simply have been avoided if the drug-free school zone statute had
explicitly defined the intended metric. In mathematics, a vaguely worded proposition is inherently
problematic and precision of terms is of the utmost importance. But it is impossible for the law-
maker to foresee the endlessly varied situations in which a statue will be applied, so small amounts
of ambiguity, rather than being the result of careless oversight, can actually help ensure that the
true intent of the law is followed. It is conceivable, for instance, that when defining school zones,
different metrics are appropriate in different situations and that forcing a Euclidean interpretation
in all cases would lead to undesirable outcomes. That said, too much ambiguity is also a problem,
since that allows room for deliberate abuse of the law. In fact, this was one of the main objections
the Court of Appeals had to the pedestrian-distance: “At a minimum, requiring speculation about
pedestrian routes would create uncertainty in a statute which was meant to establish clear lines
of demarcation.” Thus, ironically, had the legislature been tempted to eliminate ambiguity by ex-
plicitly defining the school zones using pedestrian distance, it would have unintentionally created
more ambiguity instead.
4. THE PANCAKE THEOREM
The next case involves a significant increase in the level of geometric sophistication over the
preceding Pythagorean formula case—though here the geometric insight did not occur in the legal
arguments or court ruling, but in an academic paper analyzing the case after the fact. We shall
discuss the 2015 U.S. Supreme Court case Evenwel v. Abbott and Edelman’s insightful response
to it [Ede16]. This case concerns districting, which is also the context of gerrymandering, but the
central issue here only tangentially relates to gerrymandering.
The Supreme Court ruled in 1964 that state legislatures must ensure their congressional districts
have roughly equal populations. But the ambiguity here is what exactly the term “population” is
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taken to mean. While the predominant interpretation is total population, the courts often speak in
terms of voting power, so only counting voters in the population does not seem unreasonable. In
Evenwel, the appellants wanted Texas to switch from total population to citizen voting-age popula-
tion in order to (in their view) equalize voting power thereby adhering to the intentions of the “one
person, one vote” principle. This distinction is especially salient in Texas, where there are large
numbers of undocumented immigrants who are unable to vote and therefore would lose political
power if they were not counted in the districting process. As Edelman points out, the debate in
Evenwel, and in many years of academic literature on the issue more generally, has focused on
the relative merits of these two populations (total versus citizen voting-age)—implicitly assuming
that it is not possible to create districts that equalize both construals of population. However, Edel-
man demonstrates not only that it is possible to equalize both populations, but a mechanism for
achieving this is a well-known result in topology.6
The Ham Sandwich Theorem states that given n bounded measurable subsets S1,S2, . . . ,Sn ⊂R
n
of n-dimensional Euclidean space, there exists an (n−1)-dimensional hyperplane that divides each
Si into two subsets of equal measure. In other words, we can cut n blobs in half with a single linear
slice. There is no assumption that the subsets are disjoint, they may overlap or even be nested.
The name comes from the n = 3 case where one pictures A1 and A3 as pieces of bread and A2 as a
piece of ham: a single slice cuts these all in half no matter how they are positioned (that is, even if
they are not yet neatly assembled into a sandwich). The n = 2 case is called the Pancake Theorem,
since one pictures two pancakes on a plate; this, as we shall see, is the relevant case for Evenwel.
The basic idea is to let the first pancake, A1, be the set of all people in Texas, and let the second
pancake, A2, be the set of voting-age citizens in Texas (so A2 ⊂ A1). Technically, since these are
discrete sets we should either smooth each person out so that they have well-defined areas, or we
could use the counting measure; since these result in essentially the same outcomes, let us sweep
this detail under the rug. (The only real issues with counting discrete people is that an odd number
clearly cannot be divided into two equal integers, but a ±1 error is insignificant in districting,
and a dividing hyperplane may slice through a person, but that can be avoided by perturbing the
locations very slightly.) The Pancake Theorem then tells us that a single line through Texas cuts
both populations evenly in half.
We are done if we only need two districts, but how do we get more? Edelman tells us. By
applying the same argument to each of our two districts (instead of the entire state of Texas), we
can find two line segments that slice our two districts into four so that all four have equal total
populations and equal citizen voting-age populations. Repeating this construction inductively, we
can equalize these two populations over n = 2i polyhedral districts for any i ≥ 1. But what if the
desired number of districts n is not a power of two? Dyadic fractions (numbers of the form a
2b
for a,b ∈ Z) are dense in the reals, indeed any x ∈ R can be made arbitrarily close to the dyadic
fraction
⌊2ix⌋
2i
by taking i sufficiently large, so if we want n districts then we proceed as follows:
(1) fix i ∈ N and use the above procedure to produce 2i districts equalizing both populations;
(2) define n new districts by grouping these 2i districts into collections of size ⌊2
i
n
⌋ or ⌈2
i
n
⌉.
Since these n districts in step (2) differ from each other by at most one of the smaller districts in
step (1), and these smaller districts each have 1
2i
of each population, the deviations from equality
among the populations of the n districts can be made arbitrarily small by taking i sufficiently large.
Of course, larger values of i result in more complicated district boundaries, so it might be desirable
6Not just well-known: Francis Su, former president of the MAA, declared it one of his favorite theorems from
topology! [Su]
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to seek districting outcomes using as small a value of i as possible. In Edelman’s analysis he
focuses on the large i limit, but constraining i leads to some interesting mathematical problems at
the interface of planar geometry and combinatorics, such as:
• For fixed values of n and i, how many districting outcomes are possible from Edelman’s
procedure? (Note that even a single instance of the Pancake Theorem can have non-unique
cutting lines, so there are typically many choices in producing the 2i districts in step (1)
and then of course many further choices when grouping them according to step (2).)
• For a given upper bound on the population deviations, what is the minimal value of i such
that there exists an equal districting outcome from Edelman’s procedure in which all n
districts are connected? What about connected and simply connected? (This is a reasonable
constraint from a political perspective, since districts are often required to be contiguous
and sometimes required not to have holes.)
These questions depend on the distribution of both populations across the state, so one could further
study how the answers to these questions vary as the two populations vary.
In summary, then, the legal debates (both academic and in the courtroom) have been about which
population should be equalized, but Edelman shows that any two populations (for instance, the two
considered in Evenwel) can be equalized simultaneously, and his method for doing this relies on
classical topology. Edelman’s procedure involves many choices and understanding the space of
possible districting outcomes resulting from his procedure leads to novel research problems in
pure math that potentially have significant practical applications.
5. A CARTOGRAPHIC CONTROVERSY
Our next topic is a political matter rather than a legal one, but it is close in spirit to the themes
in the rest of this paper and the geometry involved is sufficiently intriguing that we could not resist
including a brief section on it. InMarch of 2017, the Boston Public School system began displaying
a new map of the Earth in their classrooms. Word of this development quickly spread beyond local
news sources such as Boston Globe, so that within days there were articles in The Atlantic, NPR,
and even The Guardian in the U.K. about this little change to Boston classrooms. What could
possibly be so controversial about a map? The answer is a fascinating blend of colonialism and
differential geometry.
Mathematically speaking, the aim of cartography is to construct a function
S2 → [a,b]× [c,d]⊂ R2
from the sphere to a rectangular subset of the plane that respects various geometric properties of
interest. Since the sphere has positive Gaussian curvature whereas the plane has curvature zero,
such a function cannot be a local isometry; in other words, distances are necessarily distorted
when making a map of the globe. That said, one could ask for angles to be preserved (these are
conformal maps) or for areas to be preserved (these are equiareal maps)—but we cannot have both
simultaneously since a conformal equiareal map is automatically an isometry and hence preserves
curvature. So differential geometry places a serious and unavoidable constraint on the cartographer.
The most widely seen map (at least in the U.S.) is the Mercator projection, a conformal map
dating back to 1569 that can be described informally as follows: inscribe the sphere in a cylinder
and expand the sphere like a balloon until it fills an entire segment of the cylinder, then cut it
and unroll it onto a plane. This map sends meridians (circles of constant longitude) and parallels
(circles of constant latitude) to parallel lines meeting at right angles. This implies that a straight
line segment on the Mercator map corresponds to the path a ship would take if it keeps the compass
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direction constant—so the Mercator map was designed for navigational purposes and its utility in
this regard continues today. However, area is distorted: the further an object is from the equator,
the greater will be its size on the Mercator map. For instance, Africa appears roughly the same size
as Europe on a Mercator map when in fact it is nearly three times larger. Perhaps you can now see
where this is going.
The Gall-Peters projection, first created in 1855 by Gall but popularized in the 1970s by Peters,
is a particular equiareal map. This is the map the Boston schools now display in their classrooms
(often in addition to the Mercator map) as part of an effort to “decolonize the classrooms.” While
the navigational advantage of Mercator is undeniable, classroom maps are not used for naviga-
tion, they are used to show students what the world looks like—and the main objection to the
Mercator map in this context is that it inflates the size of Colonial powers. This controversy did
not begin in Boston; it was stirred up by Peters in the 1970s and even featured as a plot point
in an episode of the TV show The West Wing that aired in 2000. Mercator versus Gall-Peters—
conformal versus equiareal—this may be the only time in history that Gaussian curvature and its
differential-geometric consequences were the subject of international news and popular TV. See
[Pol00, BT04] for more on the math and history of the concepts discussed in this section.
6. IS LAW LIKE EUCLIDEAN GEOMETRY?
Scholars as early as Gottfried Leibniz (1646–1716) have advocated using a “geometric para-
digm” in legal reasoning, though the form and meaning of this has evolved over time [Hoe86].
The approach of Western legal systems in the 17th and 18th centuries was primarily inductive:
each case was considered individually according to the facts and then general rules were extrapo-
lated from the deliberations in the case. Since prior rulings were not examined in this framework,
many inconsistencies and discrepancies arose. In an effort to fix this problem, legal theorists even-
tually turned to the axiomatic deductive method of Euclid and attempted to establish a model of
law based on geometric proof. But can this really be done?
Laurence Tribe is one of the most esteemed constitutional scholars in America. He wrote the
textbook on constitutional law and was Barack Obama’s research mentor at Harvard Law; perhaps
a less well-known distinction is that he was a PhD student in pure mathematics at Harvard before
turning to legal studies. We mentioned earlier that Tribe was at the epicenter of a debate on math-
ematics in the courtroom that took place in the early 70s. In a more recent scholarly work [TD91],
coauthored with his law student at the time (and now law professor at Cornell) Michael Dorf,
Tribe addresses the question stated above of whether an axiomatic system modeled on Euclidean
geometry can be used as a basis for jurisprudence. Tribe and Dorf ultimately reach a negative
answer—more accurately, they find that doing so does not free the jurist from subjective value
judgements—but their reasoning here is quite informative.
Tribe and Dorf recall Lakatos’ influential perspective that mathematics, rather than being an
accumulation of proven truths, is a process by which proofs are made more rigorous as they are
subjected to counterexamples and criticism. While Lakatos illustrated his philosophy with Euler’s
formulaV −E +F = 2 for polyhedra, Tribe and Dorf aim to reach a broader audience by replacing
this with the high school proposition that the sum of the angles of any triangle is 180◦. They
provide a standard, elementary proof of this fact, and then suppose someone comes along with an
alleged counterexample: a triangle drawn on the surface of a sphere whose angle sum is strictly
greater than 180◦. The three approaches identified by Lakatos that mathematicians typically take
to such a situation are: (1) monster-barring, (2) exception-barring, or (3) lemma-incorporation.
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In the first case, one simply denies that a triangle on a sphere is in fact a triangle (it is, instead, a
monster!), so the result remains valid by an ad hoc and brute-force denial of challenges: anything
that disobeys the conclusions of the proposition is defined to be an object outside the scope of
the proposition statement. In the second case, one accepts the counterexample and adjusts the
proposition statement accordingly, though still in an ad hoc manner: for all triangles that are not
on the surface of a sphere, the sum of the angles is 180◦. Of course, this method does not address
the gap in the proof that led to the counterexample, so one should be concerned that there are other
counterexamples lurking around the corner. The third method is far superior: the existence of a
counterexample implies that at least one step in the original proof is false, so find what additional
properties are needed to fix the false step(s). In the Tribe-Dorf triangle example, the faulty step
is one that relies on Euclid’s fifth postulate (which does not hold for the surface of a sphere), so
the lemma-incorporator refines the proposition statement as follows: for all triangles on surfaces
for which Euclid’s fifth postulate holds, the sum of the angles is 180◦. Then if one is faced with
a particular surface and wonders whether this triangle property holds, it suffices to prove a lemma
stating that Euclid’s fifth postulate holds for this surface.
Tribe and Dorf then proceed to translate Lakatos’ three approaches to the legal realm, and they
discuss the pitfalls of each. They provide interesting examples of real cases illustrating these
ideas, but for the sake of brevity we shall only outline them in the abstract. Tribe and Dorf identify
monster-barring with the legal principle of drawing a distinction without a difference. This means,
for instance, that courts sometimes wish to grant a claimant standing without setting a broad prece-
dent that would obligate them to do so for many related suits. Thus, the court may refuse to hear
a case that seems to have similar grounds as one they previously heard, and the justification for
refusing the latter case is simply to deny the evident similarity: yes, we heard a case concerning
triangles, but your spherical triangle is no triangle at all and so need not be granted standing. Since
the next approach, exception-barring, entails adjusting the proposition statement without concern
for the purported proof, Tribe and Dorf draw a legal analogue to courts relying on the holdings
of prior cases while ignoring their rationales. The long-term problems this approach causes in the
legal profession are quite similar those it causes in the mathematical profession, so we shall not
elaborate further on it.
But what of lemma-incorporation (which is, after all, the healthiest approach to take in mathe-
matics)? Unfortunately, the analogy between math and law breaks down here, at least according to
Tribe and Dorf. Let us quote directly from their book:
[...] mathematics, by definition, proceeds from assumed unprovable postulates.
Modern mathematicians do not argue about whether Euclid’s Fifth Postulate is true
in some metaphysical sense. They know that some conjectures will be provable if
that postulate is assumed true, and others will be provable if it is not. And that is
about all there is to say in the realm of mathematics. By contrast, legal arguments
center around the truth or falsity of the preliminary assumptions. [...] Law is,
ultimately, unlike mathematics. [TD91, p. 96]
The main point, which Tribe and Dorf aptly illustrate with a historical example, is that one cannot
go back to the legal “proof” of a result and find the false step; instead, one may disagree morally
with a step of judicial reasoning, but there is no way to strengthen the legal argument by requiring
an additional condition, like we do in mathematics. A mathematician can say that the triangle sum
formula holds for all Euclidean surfaces and make no claims about non-Euclidean surfaces, but
a court cannot analogously say simply that abortion is protected by the Constitution for all those
who find the act morally acceptable.
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Curiously, a relation between legal foundations and non-Euclidean geometry was also mentioned
by the famous mathematician Lipman Bers (1914–1993) in a separate context [Ber97, p. 199]. He
gave a lecture in which he compared the 1776 Declaration of Independence with Lincoln’s 1863
Gettysburg Address by contrasting the unequivocal language of the former, “We hold these truths
to be self-evident, that all men are created equal,” with the qualified wording of the latter: “[...]
conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.” Why had this
equality been demoted from self-evident (that is, axiomatic) to a proposition (that is, dependent
upon axioms)? Bers playfully suggested that this is answered by the advent of non-Euclidean
geometry in 1830, and hence the recognition that the truth of a statement depends upon the choice
of a system of axioms.
7. THINKING LIKE A TOPOLOGIST
In the preceding section we summarized a chapter from a book by the mathematician-turned-
lawyer Laurence Tribe where it is argued that mathematics is unlike law, at least in regard to
founding the discipline on axiomatic deduction. But that does not imply that mathematical training,
or even mathematical thinking, has no jurisprudential utility. In personal correspondence with the
first author, Tribe had this to say about how he parlayed his graduate studies in mathematics into
his legal studies:
Making the adjustment to the less precise and more ambiguously framed questions,
issues, and arguments on which legal thought is based took me a couple of years,
but in the end I was very glad to have made the switch. As a legal analyst and writer,
both in my scholarly work (including my teaching) and in my advocacy, I find that
my math background suggests novel, and often useful, perspectives on problems
that others tackle less effectively for want of such a background. It’s the sensitivity
to matters of structure and not anything quantitative (more topology than calculus,
as it were) that I find entails the largest transfer from mathematical to legal thought.
Tribe is not the only scholar to find topology in legal thought. Meyerson in the book Political
Numeracy [Mey02] notes that the federalist and constitutional structure of the U.S. determines the
shape of our national governance, by balancing the power of the Union with that of the States, but
that within this shape there is enormous flexibility that has allowed our government to develop and
grow over the years. Meyerson analogizes this with the mathematical structure of a manifold in
which the geometry can be deformed drastically without altering the topological type. To illustrate
with a more concrete example, he describes the following:
Imagine the federal government as a sphere containing all of the powers granted
by the Constitution. Within that sphere, however, there exists a hole, consisting of
the powers that are, in the words of the Tenth Amendment, “reserved to the States.”
Over time, the size of the hole has grown and shrunk relative to the size of the
sphere, but the hole must remain if the Constitution’s topological structure is to
remain intact. [Mey02, p. 138]
Continuing this tour of topological and geometric thinking in law—as opposed to the more
precise manifestations of geometric concepts in the courtroom described earlier in this paper—we
come now to the social scientist Donald Black. In an interview titled “The geometry of law,” Black
describes some instances where the idea of metric geometry, in a very vague and philosophical
sense, can help illuminate power structures and inequalities in the courtroom. He uses the idea of
a multidimensional “social space” to situate legal conflicts:
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Consider the geometry of a homicide: When someone kills a stranger, for example,
the relational distance covered by the killing is greater than when someone kills a
friend or relative. Every killing also has a vertical structure. If the killer is, say,
an unemployed and impoverished member of the victim’s family while the victim
is the family’s prosperous patriarch, the killing has an upward direction (from a
lower to a higher social elevation) while the direction of the legal case is downward
(against a defendant below the victim). These relational and vertical characteristics
are just two of many elements that constitute the multidimensional structure of any
case of conflict. Moreover, the multidimensional structure of each case predicts
and explains how it will be handled — how law will behave from one case to the
next. [BJSB02]
While it is impossible to precisely define distance between the real-world concepts Black envisions,
nor would it make sense to ask whether the triangle inequality holds, the deliberately vague use of
geometric ideas employed here by Black does help one recognize subtle jurisprudential issues that
are otherwise difficult to articulate. In our opinion Black over-reaches when he claims with bizarre
specificity that “Law is a curvilinear function of relational distance,” but that does not diminish the
overall utility of his perspective.
8. CONCLUSION
Statistics has been used in the courtroom since the 19th century but, unsurprisingly, instances
of geometry and topology in the legal realm are much more rare. Nonetheless, in this paper we
have seen a case where the defendant’s punishment rests on the choice of a metric; a case where
the court debated two supposedly competing goals without realizing the Pancake Theorem allows
them both to be simultaneously satisfied; and a geo-political controversy stemming from the fact
that conformal equiareal maps preserve Gaussian curvature. We have also seen several instances
where geometric reasoning does and does not apply to jurisprudence. Underlying many of these
topics is a tension between the mathematician’s need for precision and the lawyer’s need for the
flexibility that stems from vagueness. Another central issue is that while both math and law are
predicated on logical reasoning, in math the axioms are clearly defined whereas in law they are
implicit and subjective. Regardless, the courtroom has provided an interesting setting in which a
few abstract geometric notions have been discussed and debated and contemplated, and knowledge
of these real-world events may well enrich the mathematical education of geometry students.
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